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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

VERONA WALLACE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
vs.
Case No. 240653
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING
CENTER, INC., a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action in which Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries
to her,

suffered when she fell on a slippery substance left on the

floor of Defendant's shopping center.
Plaintiff, while walking across the terrazzo floor of Defendant's Cottonwood Mall, slipped on a substance which was later identified as an Orange Julius drink,

spilled on the floor presumably by

another patron, but left on the floor for an indefinite period of
time.

(Tr. 2-4)
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury, after receiving forty-three (43) Instructions,
and deliberating, returned a special verdict as follows:
SPECIAL VERDICT
"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, for our special
verdict concerning part of the issues in this case, answer the
questions submitted as follows:
1.

was the substance on the floor for such a length of

time that the Defendant Cottonwood Mall in exercising reasonable
care should have known of its presence arrl thereafter had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition and did not do so.
ANSWER:
2.

YES

If your answer to Question No. 1 is "yes" then was such

conduct of defendant, Cottonwood Mall, a proximate cause of
Plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:
3.

YES

At the time and place in question and under the conditions

as shown by the evidence, was the Plaintiff, Verona Wallace, negligent?
ANSWER:
4.

YES

If your answer to Question No. 3 is "yes", was such negli-

gence of the plaintiff a proximate cause of her own injuries?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

5.

Considering all negligence that caused the accident at

One Hundred Percent (100%), what percentage of that negligence is
attributable to:

6.

(a)

Defendant, Cottonwood Mall

---'l'-0_ _

(b)

Plaintiff, Verona Wallace

_ _.;;1;...0_ _

( c)

Others

_ _8_0_ _

(d)

Total

--"1'-0_0_ _%

%.

%.

%.

Set forth the amount of damages that you find Plaintiff,

Verona Wallace, has suffered as a result of the injuries received
in the accident in question:
Medical Expenses
(Medications, X-ray, Doctor
bills, and etc.)

$ 300.00
$ 1760.00

Other Special Damages
(Expenses for Housekeeping
bills, and Etc.)
General Damages
(Mental & Physical Pain and
Suffering, and etc.}

$_ _o
__

$ 2,060.00

TOTAL

Dissenting Jurors:

7

No. of Questions To Which Juror
Dissented
1

2
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DATED this

3/23

day of March, 1978.

ROSE N. KRAMER
Foreman or Forelady
(Tr. 117-118)

o

Later the Court entered Judgment on the Special verdict in
favor of the Defendant and against Plaintiff "No Cause of Action"
and awarded costs to Defendant.

(Tr. 12 5-12 7) •

It is from this Special Verdict and the Judgment on the Verdiet and the Instructions which Plaintiff-Appellant alleges were
confusing to the jury, that she appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
ARGUMENT
POINT I
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 IS VERY CONFUSING AND CANNOT BE SQUARED
WITH ANY OF THE PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS.
The words and construction

"In answering the parts of the

damage question, be careful not to include or duplicate in any
parts amounts included in any other part answered by you."

That

part of the Instruction Appellant submits is so unintelligible as
to thoroughly confuse the jury.
This confusion is born out by the unintelligible answers
found in the Special Verdict.
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POINT II
THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 1 FOUND
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES.
You are instructed that the Cottonwood Mall is subject to
liability for the harm caused to the plaintiff by a condition on
the floor at the Cottonwood Mall if, but only if, you find from a
preponderance of the evidence that:
1.

The presence of the substance constituted a dangerous and

unsafe condition, and
2.

That the defendant, Cottonwood Ma-11, by or through its

agents had actual notice of the presence of the substance prior
to the accident, and thereafter had a reasonable opportunity to
remedy the condition and did not do so, or that if the Defendant
did not know of the presence of the substance causing plaintiff
to fall that it had been on the floor so long that the defendant
in exercising reasonable care should have known of its presence
and thereafter had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition
and did not do so."
The jury in answer to No. 1 found in substance that Defendant
was in fact negligent and that the negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury.

In other words by the jury's answer to No. 1

it found Defendant did have an opportunity by exercising reasonable
care to discover the slippery

substance in time to avoid the acci-
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Again, in answer to Question No. 2, the jury again found
the conduct of Defendant the proximate cause of the injury.

POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE SO INCONSISTENT THAT THE JURY WAS
CONFUSED.
Instruction No. 9 tells the jury Plaintiff was an invitee
with a duty on the part of Defendant to keep the premises in a
safe condition for Plaintiff to enter and take care of the business
that brought her to Cottonwood Mall.
Again, in Instruction No. 10, the jury was instructed in substance that the duty to make the premises safe for Plaintiff extended to all portions of the premises.
Instruction No. 11 again tells the jury that if the substance
remained on the floor long enough for Defendant to have discovered
it, the jury must find in favor of Plaintiff and assess damages
accordingly.

This is exactly what the jury did by answers to both

No. 1 and No. 6 of the Special Verdict wherein it found in No. 1
that the substance was on the floor for a reasonable time to give
Defendant an opportunity to remedy the peril.
In its answer to No. 6 of the Special Verdict it assessed
the damages accordingly.

The jury also in response to Instruction

No. 11 assessed the damages accordingly.
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Again, in Instruction No. 12 the jury is told again in substance of the duty of Defendant to keep the premises safe for its
patrons.
However, starting with Instruction No. 16 the jury is suddenly instructed in another direction.

The 16th Instruction appears

to the Appellant to be further confusing to the jurors.
Coming to Instruction No. 20, the Court instructed the jury,
we submit, in direct conflict to the earlier instructions -

"In

the exercise of its duty the Cottonwood Mal; must use reasonable
and ordinary care, but under the law it is not an insurer of, nor
does it guarantee the safety of users of the premises."
Instruction No. 21 is in direct conflict with the earlier
instruction regarding its duty to make the premises safe.
Again, the jury answered Instruction No. 22 that the slippery
substance remained on the floor long enough to give Defendant, in
the exercise of reasonable care, an opportunity to remedy the condition before the injury.

However, the emphasis this time tends

to excuse Defendant, with the further resultant confusion to the
jury.
Instruction No. 24 regarding "Defendant having the right to
assume that _users of the Mall have normal eyesight and that they
use the same in exercising ordinary care for their own safety
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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unless,

in the exercise of due care, Defendant observes or should

observe something to warn him to the contrary."
We respectfully submit this Instruction is meaningless and
again confusing to a jury.
We further submit that Instruction No. 25 is in direct conflict with the earlier instructions in which the Court in Instructions No. 9, 10, and 11 tells

the jury Plaintiff is an In-

vitee and that the Defendant has a duty to make the premises safe
for her in the transaction of her business at Cottonwood Mall.
However, at Instruction No. 25 the Court places Plaintiff in the
category of a licensee and that she is required "to observe" and
be aware of the existing conditions then and there present, and
to keep a lookout for obstacles or other conditions reasonably
to be anticipated."

Again, the jury was, we submit, left with a

confused definition of what the duties of each Plaintiff and Defendant were and wherein the liability lay.

Under the Instructions

the Court left the jury in a conflicting position as to whether
Plaintiff was an invitee or licensee which we submit utterly confused them.
POINT IV
THE ANSWERS IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT ARE SO INCONSISTENT AS TO
WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.
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We have pointed out the various inconsistencies in the Instructions to the jury.

The verdict bears out the fact that not

only were the Instructions misleading and confusing, but also that
the answers in the Special Verdict bear out the confusion.

It is

apparent that the jury intended to award damages to Plaintiff and
the jurors even set out the amount (Answer No. 6).
POINT V.
THE COURT HAD A DUTY TO CLARIFY THE APPARENT CONFUSION OF
THE JURY WHEN THE VERDICT WAS RETURNED.
We respectfully submit that the Judge presiding at the trial
had a duty to reinstruct the jury, or set aside the verdict when
it was returned with such an apparent confused Answers and Findings.
53 Am. Jur 440 #554: "If a case should go to the jury at all,
it should go under proper instructions correctly declaring the
legal principles involved.

Instructions which are erroneous and

misleading constitute grounds for a new trial or reversal of the
judgment, unless the error is harmless."
Again, at 53 Am. Jur. 442 #557:

"Instructions as a whole must

be consistent and harmonious, not conflicting and contradictory.
Where instructions givaito the jury for their guidance, contradictory
and conflicting rules which are unexplained and where following one
might lead to a different result than would obtain by following the
other, the instructions are inherently defective ••••. Inconsistent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the jury are thereby left in doubt and without any certain guide
as to the law arising upon the evidence.
88 C.J.S.:

Inconsistent and Contradictory Instructions:

"Instructions must not be conflicting, inconsistent or contradictory.

It is, therefore, proper to refuse, and error to give,

conflicting and contradictory instructions, and this is particularly true where the conflicting and contradictory instructions are
on a material point or issue, since a charge containing two distinct propositions conflicting with each other tends so to confuse
the jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent verdict.
"The jury cannot be required to determine what part of a contradictory charge is correct, and it is not for the jury to select
from contradictory instructions those that correctly express the
law, and they should not be left to reconcile conflicting points
of law.

Where inconsistent and contradictory instructions are

given, it ordinarily cannot be determined from the verdict which
rule was adopted by the jury, and the court is thus left in doubt
and uncertainty as to the facts actually found by the jury as a
basis for its verdict, and where instructions are inconsistent
with, or conflict each other, it is usually impossible to say
whether the jury were controlled by the one or the other.
"It may, consequently, be ground for reversal where contraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it has been said that the mere fact that an instruction conflicts
with another instruction is in itself no reason for condemning it,
and correct instructions do not become erroneous merely because
they are in conflict with incorrect instructions given for the opposite party.

An inconsistent instruction cannot be sustained on

the theory that a defendant was entitled to a peremptory instruction.
Judgment will not be reversed where the inconsistency is only apparent, and not actual, or if it is apparent from reading the
charge as a whole that the jury could not have been misled, and
charges should not be examined with a legal microscope for technical flaws and contradictory statements.

In determining whether

there is a conflict, the decisive question is whether the instructions read as a whole and in light of the circumstances of the request in which they are given, are apt to confuse a person of ordinary intelligence.
Simpson vs. General Motors Corp. 24 Utah 2nd 301, 470 P 2nd
399:

"Specific jury instructions should be considered in its en-

tirety along with all other instructions."

(No such instruction

was given in the instant case) •
See DeMille vs. Erickson, 23 Ut 2nd 278, 462 P2nd 159.
In Barton vs. Jensen, 19 Ut 2nd 196 (429 P2nd 44) Tuckett, J.:
"A majority of the members of the Court are of the opinion that in
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the case to the jury upon a general verdict.

It appears that

the best efforts of trial judge to make interrogatories simple,
concise, and understandable still result in juries misunderstanding what is intended."
Badger vs. Clayson 18 Ut 2nd 329, 422 P 2nd 665.
Brm.sonvs. Strong, 17 Ut2nd 364, 412 P2nd 451.
Wellman vs. Noble, 366 P2nd 701, 12 Ut 2nd 350.
Ivie v.s Richardson, 9 Ut2nd 5, 336 P2nd 781.
Joseph vs. W. H. Groves LDS Hospital, 318 P2nd 330, 7 Ut2nd 39.

SUMMARY
In conclusion we respectfully submit the inconsistencies
of the Instructions, and particularly the conflicting instructions
as to whether Plaintiff was a licensee or an invitee were incorrect and resulted in the confused and hardly intelligible verdict.
Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

e;;< l-:,~~ark ~;v&;~;t;&
. l~--~A'l-"tC~A_
for Plaintiff
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